proved overwhelming, undermining even the best etforts to develop each ~ountry's non-oil economy, eradicate poverty, and improve living standards tor broad-based segments of the population.
There is still great controversy over the best way to escape the rentier syndrome. for some analysts, a microeconomic approach stressing increased competition, privatization, and greater incentives for risktaking is key. For others, the establishment of supporting macroeconomic institutions, such as a sound financial system and efficient, equitable tax systems, play a central role. Others focus on the necessity of developing stable and etlective macroeconomic policies-the efficient timing and focus of fiscal and monetary policies. In addition, a growing school of thought suggests that governance issues predominate. The failure of the rentier states to eliminate corruption whil~ developing responsive government institutions is the main factor accounting for poor economic performance in the rentier states.
A related controversy surrounds the extent to which useful generalizations can be made about the rentier economies. Although all share a number of common structural conditions, are these similar enough to form an economic environment that responds predictably to a common set of policy initiatives? Or is each rentier economy likely to have unique features to the extent that require a tailor-made economic program for achieving, growth, diversification, and integration into the global economv?
This chapter examines these issues from the perspective of the two largest rentier states in the Gult:._Saudi Arabia and Iran. What do these economies share in common? What are their chief differences? Which has made the most progress to date in transitioning away from the rentier state svndrome? What tasks lay before them in their integration to the world econu'my? In particular, which area of refrirms appear critical for successful transition to a more normal economy capable of generating self.sustained growth independent of conditions in the oil markets? Based on the answers to these questions, a final section examines the implications for Iraq. RENTIER 
MALAISE
The recent oil price increases have given both Saudi Arabia and Iran a temporary reprieve from their longer-run economic dilemmas. Both countries are experiencing transitions that arc complex and decisive for tl1eir futures. Both are facing a dual set of problems: on the one hand, those of a developm? country and, on the other, those ofa rentier economy. Both possess some of the main characteristics of a developing country: a predominantly young population and an economy mainly focused on the primary sector-oil for both, with Iran having, in addition, a large agricultural sector.
The rcnticr nature of both economics is no less evident: revenues derived from oil represent the bulk of public and external revenues. In essence, these revenues enable the governments in each country to dominate the private REFORMING THE RENTIER STATE 39 large. In short, the collection and subsequent redistribution of oil revenues takes on both an economic and political dimension. Both economies are faced with dual challenges: first, transforming the rentier economy into a diversified economy through encouraging expansion in the non-oil private sector areas of activity and, second, implementing the political reforms necessary for establishing institutions and governance structures capable of creating an environment conducive to enabling non-oil activities to operate on a sustained basis.
Saudi Arabia
Within this context, Saudi Arabia is currently facing a number of challenges. The first problem involves attaining and maintaining economic growth rates that are least sufficient to keep pace with the rise in population. For Saudi Arabia, low economic growth has become a chronic problem (see table 3.1 ). Gross domestic product (GDP) increased by only 1.6 percent between 1990 and 2000, whereas growth in the country's population grew at an annual rate of 2 .7 percent during that period, thus producing a declining trend in per capita income. 6 This low rate of growth cannot be attributed to a lack of capital formation. In fact, the rate of investment is relatively high in Saudi Arabia. The Sixth Development Plan (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , for instance, envisaged a total capital of around 472 billion riyals ($125.8 billion), including nearly 212.7 billion riyals ($56.7 billion) from the private sector. It had also targeted an economic growth rate of 3.8 percent over the plan period. By the end of the plan, actual investment increased by around 2 percent to 481 billion riyals ($128.2 billion) including nearly 292 billion riyals ($77.8 billion) from the private sector, an increase of around 37 percent over the projected lcvel. 7 Thus, even though the plan overachieved in terms of investment, it underachieved in terms of what really counts: real economic growth. The ineffectiveness of investment to sustain growth appears to be structural, stemming in part from a weakening of the linkage between public and private expenditures together with a decline in the ability of public expenditures to stimulate real output. 8 Given the inability of the public sector to directly stimulate real non-oil output, all of the pressure to provide expanded employment opportunities, jobs, and output is now placed on the private sector. Job creation is then the second major problem facing the region. Ironically, even though the Saudi economy is heavily dependent on foreign workers ( 4.6 million or 71 percent of the country's workforce), the unemployment rate among Saudis is 8.2 percent, reaching 32 percent among younger workers.
The third challenge relates to maintaining the pace of economic reforms. Here the Saudis have initiated a series of measures designed to attract foreign investment, deregulate many key industries, and liberalize the economy to qualify for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well as to facilitate further economic integration with the country's tellow GCC members.
If carried out successfully, economic reforms should remove many of the constraints currently impeding growth and job creation in the private sector. As discussed below, this is critical, given the current inability of public expenditures to perform this task. The country's three main challenges-restoring rates of growth above that of the population, expanding job creation, and implementing a comprehensive reform package-appear to he relatively compatible. Good progress in the reform area should assure higher rates of economic growth and, through that, more jobs. But will they be jobs for Saudis? Apparently, the government is not confident this will be the case because it is simultaneously broadening and expanding its Saudization program. The Saudi government appears to feel that if jobs cannot be created through high rates of investment, then they must be forced through quotas.
Iran
Iran faces a similar set of challenges. Although the country's growth has not decelerated (sec table 3.2) to the extent found in Saudi Arabia, there are several troubling trends.
9 During 1960-76, Iran enjoyed one of the fastest growth rates in the world. The economy grew at an average rate of9.8 percent in real terms and real per capita income growth averaged 7 percent.
This growth trend was reversed during 1977-88, reflecting the aftereffects of the 1979 revolution, the eight-year war with Iraq, sanctions and international isolation, the increased state dominance of the economy, and plummeting oil output and revenue. In 1988, oil production was only 36 percent of its (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) was followed · by the stagnation of 1993-94 when the economy was hit by lower oil prices, lack of external financing, and economic sanctions. The ensuing severe debt crisis, together with inappropriate macroeconomic policies, had an adverse impact on growth, which hovered around 3.6 percent during 1995-2000.
In the more recent period (2000-03), real GDP grmvth has increased to 6 percent due to significance progress in economic reforms: exchange rate unification, trade liberalization, opening up to foreign direct investment (FDI), and financial sector liberalization. Higher oil prices and expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have also contributed to the country's recent economic recovery.
As is the case with Saudi Arabia, growing unemployment is becoming a major social and political problem. During the 1996-2000 period, 693,000 new workers entered the labor market whereas only 296,000 jobs were created. The result is a current rate of unemployment of over 20 percent of the active population. This unemployment mainly affects the young urban population. According to the World Bank, the creation of between 700,000 to 800,000 new jobs each year (thereby achieving unemployment rate stability) would require an annual growth of the economy of at least 6 percent per annum. 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 Iran is attempting to put more flexibility and job creating capacitv into its ~conomy through a series of reforms. Although some progress has ~ccurred 111 the last several years, the country still lags considerably behind Saudi Arabia in many critical areas. Using the aggregate economic freedom index discussed below (where higher numbers signify lower levels of freedom), it is interesting to note a general backsliding in Saudi reform efforts, whereas those in Iran appear to be cautiously moving ahead (see figure 3 .1).
L__ _
Although notable differences exist, Saudi Arabia and Iran appear to share a number of common economic characteristics and face a set of similar challenges. In recent years many of these problems seem to have intensified, perhaps because the pace of population growth, globalization, and technological change are outpacing the ability of the rentier system to effectively resolve new challenges as they arise.
COMMONALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH OIL
In attempting to explain the inability of rentier economies to sustain steady expansions in their economies, most researchers have focused on their mo;t apparent defining teatures: the manner in which oil revenues accrue to the government and the subsequent impacts the utilization of these revenues have on economic activity. In this regard, a large literature has spawned in recent years attempting to clarify some of the complex and negative transmission mechanisms associated with oil revenues, especially those that occur during pe~ods of rapidly rising petroleum prices. 10 There are many competing explanations, but they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.11 They may reinforce each other, resulting in a slowing of economic growth and productivity. In extreme cases, the non-oil sector of the economy even begins to contract.
One way to understand the uniqueness of the rentier state is to contrast its dynamics to that of a normal economy, known as the production state (see table 3.3 ). Because the rentier state is not based on broad-based production, its main dynamic stems from the forces set in motion by the distribution of revenues. Several mechanisms associated with this expenditure help define the rcntier state's rather unique development pattern. The Dutch Disease Effect
The mechanism that has probably gained the most attention in academic .circles is the so-called Dutch Disease. This phenomenon has two effects both .of which should concern postwar Iraq. The first focuses narrowly on the exchange rate. In technical terms, the Dutch Disease refers to the potentially adverse effects of a booming export sector on the performance of other exports and of industries competing against imports. These effects work through a strengthening (appreciation) of the exporting country's exchange rate. In the 1960s, the Netherlands experienced a vast increase in its wealth after discovering large natural gas deposits in the North Sea. Unexpectedly, this seemingly positive development had serious repercussions on important segments of the country's economy, as the Dutch guilder became stronger (a 30 percent appreciation), making Dutch non-oil exports less competitive. The exchange rate appreciation resulting from a ramp-up of oil exports is likely to reduce the profitability and competitiveness of traditional agricultural exports. It would also encourage imports of food and raw materials, which may compete with domestic production. It is also likely to discourage the emergence of new manufacturing exports, essential for the successful diversification of the economy. The expansion of Iranian oil export earnings in the 1970s provides a good example of these effects. 12 The second effect of concern is that, during the modernization and expansion of the oil sector, the rest of the economy may be crowded out from access to key factor inputs. That is, the oil sector, with its financial resources, would preempt these resources, weakening the ability of the private sector to invest and diversify.
The Dutch Disease also tends to result in increased poverty, but here the links are more difficult to establish. 13 The price distortions created by the appreciating exchange rate can be seen as a tax on exports, and, if the country has a trade pattern based on comparative advantage, this would likely involve labor-intensive activities. Rates of economic growth in these areas would decline, inhibiting any tendency for benefits of oil-based expenditures to "trickle down." Under these circumstances, the economy would likely become more vulnerable to external shocks from which the poor cannot protect themselves. Finally, the inflation stemming from expanded oil-financed expenditures would, again, likely harm the poor disproportionately.
Although the disease is generally associated with a natural resource discovery, it can occur from any development that results in a large inflow of foreign currency, including a sharp surge in natural resource prices, foreign assistance, and FDI, all of which are distinct future possibilities for a country such as Iraq.
The Rentier Society/ Authoritarian Effect
The s~c~n~ ~imens'.~n ot~egati;e .oil-related effects has to do with govern-institutional and other policy changes. It also can lead to the development of a rentier society where there is often a disconnect between effort and reward. A common result is the creation of a dualistic economy where a vibrant oil and gas sector coexists with a weak, poorly performing non-oil economy.
Along these lines, Halliday has noted that the uniqueness of oil resides ... in the peculiar form of payment resulting from it, a rent to producer states that does not entail the forward and backward linkages within the local economy that are characteristic of other primary production in the third world. The collection of this "rent'' enables the producer state, and those controlling it, to amass enormous sums of money without engaging in any form of production; it is this which has generated such major social tensions within the producer states. These tensions include growing income inequality, rampant corruption in the state, grandiose development projects, and the neglect of productive activity and skills, especially in agriculture.
14 Because oil infrastructure can be controlled easily by a few, it leads to a concentration of political power. Thus, rentier states tend to be authoritarian (as shown in table 3.4). There are several reasons for the political system to evolve in this direction. 15 First, an oil-rich government can provide vast social services without taxing the public. Because there's no taxation, there's less demand fi.)r representation. Rentier governments also tend to buy off the opposition and amass large internal security forces capable of crushing dissent. Second, the skewed development of oil-dependent states means that they lack the working-and middle-class citizens, who historically have been a force pushing for democracy. In short, whereas oil exporters fall into a number of political categories, lack of accountability and transparency is a common characteristic of the group. Again, these patterns are readily apparent when, as noted earlier, comparisons arc made with so-called production economies (table 3. 2). The net effect of these factors has led (to one degree or another) to corruption, mismanagement, and a colossal waste of resources. Whereas Saudi Arabia's political system dearly falls in the "paternalistic autocracy" group, Iran's is rather unique and hence more difficult to characterize. The Iranian state appears to be guided by a "benevolent neutrality" in its relations with citizens where any modification (in the fixm of decreases in subsidies, for example) or reduction in living standards has a major political impact. These forces arc offset to a certain degree by an additional element ensuring the cohesion of the system: a strong ideological system (Shi'ite Islam) encompassing all economic and political spheres, both at the public and private level.
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The Fiscal Uncertainty Effect
The final dimension of oil-related problems stems from the fiscal implications of fluctuating and uncertain revenues. Although one cannot say that oil revenues create a certain political system, it is a fact that, for the most part, the political systems adopted by most of the oil-exporting countries are shortsighted and pursue a pro-cyclical stabilization policy. The net effect is to intensify the detrimental impact that fluctuations in oil prices have on the domestic economy.
Oil-exporting countries' budgetary patterns tend to be an extreme version of the fiscal rules used in many developing countries facing fluctuating revenues. Many of these countries initiate expanded capital expenditures during periods of rising revenues on the assumption that these revenues are sustainable. When revenues decline, budgetary cuts occur, but in a fairly predictable manner. 17 In general, social sectors are less vulnerable to cuts than defense and administration, which, in turn, are considerably less vulnerable than production and infrastructure. 18 Of course, these patterns can be affected by the willingness of countries to assume increased governmental debt in an attempt to maintain programs during periods of declining revenues. Another complicating factor, especially for Middle Eastern oil exporters, is their large budgetary commitment to defense expenditures. These factors c~mbine _to
Budgetary Patterns in Saudi Arabia
As is well known, Saudi Arabia has experienced ongoing budget difficulties since the mid-l 980s. Growing deficits have been the norm with non-oil revenues unable to pick up the slack during periods of falling oil revenues. What is less well known is that the composition of public expenditures has been undergoing some profound changes during this period. Of particular significance is the fact that economic expenditures (economic services, transport and communications, and infrastructure) have declined steadily since 1980, from around 25 percent of the budget at that time to a little over 7 percent by 2003. 19 Social expenditures (human resource development and health) have been the major beneficiaries of the decline in economic allocations more than doubling their share of the budget over the period 1979-2003 (from 13 percent to nearly 32 percent of total expenditures). As noted, defense remains the largest budgetary item, fluctuating in the 35-40 percent range in the period after 1988 (figure 3.2).
Public expenditures (administration, loans, and subsidies) have shown the most erratic pattern. After fluctuating at around 35 percent of the budget between 1979 and 1994, they tell sharply to less than 20 percent in 1999 only to increase to about 27 percent in 2003. The sharp decline in public expenditures in the early-to-mid-l 990s stemmed, in part, from a sharp cutback in the government's loan programs.
The patterns described are suggestive of an environment in which the public sector is contracting in many areas. This is especially the case with regard to economic expenditures and other activities directly supportive of the private sector. Budgetary shifts away from economic categories are the 45 
40
' Broad budgetary categories -~ -Economic --+--Social --o--· PublicDefense most obvious manitestation of this phenomenon. Falling shares of investment relative to non-oil output arc also indicative of Saudi Arabia's capital stock and productive expenditures playing much less of a stimulating role as in the unbalanced growth strategy implicit in the early oil-boom years. 20 More subtle shifts in policy or policy effectiveness can only be inferred from a more detailed analysis of budgetary patterns and their impacts. Of particular importance are the linkages between public and private sector expenditures (output) on non-oil production and investment. In this regard, a common theme in the development literature is that economic processes in oil-based countries become more complex as these economies mature and begin tu diversify away from a complete reliance on oil revenues and associated public sector expenditures. There is clear evidence that this process is well advanced in Saudi Arabia. 21 With regard to the economy's leading productive sectors, several patterns stand out: 22 ( 1) Growth in the agricultural and mining sectors became more dependent on private expenditures and less dependent on public expenditures, especially during the 1975-2001 period. (2) The non-oil manufacturing sector has become almost completely dependent on private sector expenditures, with strong linkages to these expenditures in both the short and longer term. In contrast, public sector expenditures now have little stimulating effects on the sector. However with regard to public expenditures, this effect is confined to the longer-term effrcts of governmental expenditures. (7) Finallv, linkages between private expenditures and the service sector (community, social, and personal services) have strengthened considerably in recent years. This sector's links to public sector expenditures have also weakened.
In sum, the pattern found here is one of strengthening linkages between private sector expenditures and sectoral output. At the same time, the ability ,.,,f--r.11h1;,-"'"r~~-,,..-,.,,,,....,,,.,...,.,-1:~ .. manufacturing and construction, public sector expenditures no longer play a role in affecting output growth. In other areas, such as agriculture, mining, trade, and services, public expenditures may only play a minor role in the overall growth of these areas of activity.
The question that immediately arises concerns the factors responsible for the deterioration in links between government expenditures and, for all practical purposes, the rest of the economy. Given the fall in the relative share of government expenditures in such areas as non-oil GDP, diminishing returns can no doubt be ruled out. The major changes in the composition of the government's budget noted above would appear to be a more likely source of the decline in the strength of public sector linkages.
Again, in aggregating the various sections of the government's budget into four main categories (social expenditures, economic expenditures, public expenditures, and detCnse ), several interesting statistical patterns emerge that may help to explain the effect of public expenditures on the non-oil private sector. First, looking at the links between government revenues and expenditures, economic expenditures, public expenditures, and defense spending reveals a similar pattern: each expands in the short run with increased government revenues (of course, they would also contract with falling revenues). This pattern carries over into the longer term with each category of expenditure maintaining a stable relationship with revenues. 23 On the other hand, there do not appear to be any links, either short or long term, between revenues and social expenditures. As noted, this category has been the fastest growing category of expenditures. More importantly, it, along with defense, now dominates the government budget. The fact that the expansion in social expenditures appears to be independent of the government's revenue position suggests that either these allocations receive a much higher priority over other expenditures and/ or that the government is willing to incur large deficits to fund these programs. No doubt their rather steady increase until the last several years means that they have played a rather limited role in fiscal macroeconomic stabilization.
A closer look at social expenditures reveals that their budgetary share has grown largely at the expense of several economic sections of the budget, namely transport, communications, and direct economic allocations. Short run increases in social expenditures had a negligible impact on their budgetary shares. However, the more fundamental long-term impact was clearly negative. The only economic category not adversely affected was infrastructure, where social expenditures did not appear to affect this categories' budgetary share in either the short or longer term. The dramatic decline in the budgetary share of subsidies may be attributed in part to the growth of social expenditures. Both the short-and long-term impacts of expanded social expenditures reduced the proportion of the budget allocated to subsidies.
Interestingly, detense allocations did not suffer at the hands of social expenditures.
2 "' Short-run increases in the budgetary share going to social ,~.,t-Prn,r1Pc-.,,~t-n"llu inrrP"\cPA t-hP ch'lrP nf t-hP h11rl<!Pt" ,-nnt-rnJlpd hv dpff..n~t"
were the only budgetary subcategory unatlected by the expansion of social expenditures. The contraction of this category apparently was due, in part, to a shift in governmental priorities rather than a direct allocation conflict with social expenditures. In short, the high priority given to social expenditures, followed by defrnse together with limited oil revenues during most of this period, resulted in a tremendous contraction in the public sector's allocation to economic services of various types.
Patterns of Productivity and Growth
The three dimensions of the "Paradox of Plenty"-Dutch Disease, rentier state, and fiscal uncertainty-have combined to produce, in part, the dismal performance of rentier states noted earlier. This pattern has been confirmed in a recent study examining the sources of economic growth in various parts of the world. 25 At issue is how much of the growth in output per worker is associated with growth in physical and human capital per worker and how it can be attributed to other factors, such as technological change. This latter category is often referred to in the literature as total factor productivity (TFP).
26
The importance ofTfP stems from the fact that, in its absence, economic growth eventually slows and stagnates due to diminishing returns to capital formation. Within this context, there are striking differences in the manner in which oil and non-oil economies grow (see table 3.5): 
Under the first specification, in which human capital equals raw labor, the contribution ofTFP to growth is positive. On the other hand, if we assume a linear effect of education to human capital, the contribution ofTFP becomes negative. As the IMF notes, 28 a more realistic TFP estimate may lie between these two extreme cases. In particular, it is likely there was a very small (or even negative) contribution ofTFP to growth during the 1989-2002 subperiod due to slow progress in structural reforms and increased macroeconomic instability.
If Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the other rcntier states want to achieve better economic performance, their governments will have to create an environment that encourages and forces sustained levels of positive TFP. Again, it is unlikely this has happened on a sustained basis in the oil economies outside of Norway. There is still great controversy over the best way to stimulate TFP. For some analysts, increased competition, privatization, and greater incentives for risktaking are key. 29 For others, the establishment of supporting institutions (i.e., ·an independent central bank, a sound financial system, and efficient, equitable tax systems) play a central role. 30 Both of these strategics are critically dependent on the progress made in economic reforms (economic freedom) and improved governance. Implied in these measures is the notion that economic freedom also requires governments to refrain from many activities. They must refrain from actions that interfere with personal choice, voluntary exchange, and the freedom to enter and compete in labor and product markets. Economic freedom is reduced when taxes, government expenditures, and regulations arc substituted for personal choice, voluntary exchange, and market coordination. Restrictions that limit entry into occupations and business activities also retard economic freedom.
The index provides a framework for assessing progress toward a modern m::irlrt>t Pronomv intPO"r:>tP~ into thP aloh::il Pronomv· how onPn countries ;tre through taxation, spending, or overregulation ), and the strength and independence of a country's judiciary to enforce rules and protect private property. Some countries may have freedom in all factors; others may have freedom in just a fow. One of the most important findings of research carried out using the index is that economic freedom is required in all aspects of economic lite. Countries must score well in all ten of the factors in order to improve thei~, economic efficiency and consequently the living standards of their people.'·' As noted earlier, Saudi Arabia's progress in attaining economic freedom has been rather slow, suggesting that despite the fact that a number of reforms have been enacted in recent years, their impact has been somewhat limited. According to the Heritage/Wall Street Journal index, economic freedom by 2004 was a bit lower than in the mid-l 990s ( figure 5. l ) . In 1996, Saudi Arabia was classified as mostly free (index= 2.95). Starting in 1999, however, Saudi Arabia's economic freedom index moved into a range characterized as mostly un-free, reaching its lowest point in 2002. 34 Saudi Arabia's relative lack of economic freedom is illustrated by particularly low scores (table 3 .7) in several of the ten categories noted above: trade policy; government intervention; foreign investment; and banking and finance. ln fact, the country consistently received a "free" score in only one area-monetary policy. Wages and pri~es and fiscal burden were the. only areas consistently receiving a "mostly free" score, whereas trade policy, government intervention, foreign investment, and banking and finance consistently received scores of "repressed." Clearly, these are the areas that need the most immediate attention.
In contrast to Saudi Arabia, Iran's economy has been in the "repressed" range as defined by the economic freedom index. Hopes for broad-based economic reform were raised under President Mohammed Khatami, who was reelected in June 2001. But, Khatami's reform efforts were largely thwarted by opposition from entrenched interests, government bureaucrats who Iran's economic freedom lags behind that of Saudi Arabia in all areas with t:he exception of trade policy. The country receives the lowest score possible ( 5.0) in a number of areas including, (a) government intervention, (b) banking and finance, (c) property rights, (d) regulation, and (e) informal (black) markets.
Looking at the specific areas of economic freedom, several distinctive patterns stand out between the two countries.
Trade Policy. Saudi Arabia receives consistently low scores in this area largely because of~ wide range of nontariff barriers. Saudi Arabia also has a number of preferences for Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC) countries as well as a vast government program that favors domestic producers. Hopefully, the phasing out of these restrictions will also pave the way for Saudi Arabia's entry into the World Trade Organization. Traditionally the main instruments used by Iran to restrict trade were nontariff barriers and the system of multiple exchange rates. However, with the unification of the exchange rate, the country has taken a major stride toward freer trade.
Government Intervention. Saudi Arabia was considered to have a low degree of economic freedom in this area because of the high level of government consumption (27 percent of GDP in 2001). A gradual shift in budget priorities toward investment and away from government salaries/welfare state should assist Saudi Arabia's movement to a higher degree of economic freedom without disrupting the economy or risking higher levels of unemployment.
Iran received the lowest score possible ( 5.0) in this area, largely because of its inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and politically powerful individuals and institutions such as the bonyad (Islamic charities that control large business conglomerates). The bonyad have established a tight grip on much of the non-oil economy, utilizing their preferential access to domestic credit, foreign exchange, licenses, and public contracts to protect their positions. These advantages have made it difficult for the private sector to compete and, as a result, it remains small and incapable of playing a major role in creating new employment opportunities.
Capital Flows and Foreign Investment.
Although Saudi Arabia receives a relatively low score in this area, the country appears to be actively working to actual practice.
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Commonly noted problems for foreign investors include: the existence of many disincentives to invest (including the absence of accurate data); a government requirement that companies hire Saudi nationals; slow payment of government contracts; a restrictive visa policy for all workers; and enforced segregation of the sexes in most businesses.
Iran received a similar score for reforms in this area. However, in 2002 the government updated its foreign investment code for the first time in over SO years with the enactment of the Law on the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment. Certain limitations on foreign investment were incorporated into this law including the prohibition of a market share of greater than 25 percent in one sector or J5 percent in individual industries. The statute also guaranteed market-rate compensation for assets that are nationalized. Most importantly, the country now allows for international arbitration in legal disputes, addressing a key concern of foreign investors. By late 2004, however, hard-liners were advancing a legislative agenda in the Iranian parliament that would effectively hamper fixeign investment, make it more dif· ficult for the government to negotiate deals with foreign companies, and roll back privatization plans:l 0 Banking and Finance. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, the country's central bank, maintains tight control over the country's banking system. Saudi domestic commercial banks are heavily exposed to the government and to contractors dependent on government payments. A~ a result, the country receives a fairly low score in this area. A major complaint is that credit institutions such as the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) allocate credit based largely_on government-set criteria rather than on market conditions. Iran's banking and finance system received the lowest score possible. A number of factors contributed to the sector's dismal state of affairs, including the fact that the ability of banks to charge interest is restricted under Iran's interpretation oflslamic law, and much of the country's commercial bank loan portfolio is tied up in low return loans to state-owned enterprises and politically connected individuals and businesses. However, in 2000 the government began permitting private banks for the first time since the revolution. Several private banks have opened, but they are not expected to have a major impact on the country's financial svstem because their operations arc tightly regulated. Their ability to attrac.t funds is also limited by the central bank's policy that limits the interest rate they set to within 2 percentage points of those offered bv the state-owned commercial banks.
.
Wages and Prices.
The Saudi Arabian domestic market for private goods and services is fairly free of wage and price controls. Religious leaders in the country consider market interforcnces as contrary to Islamic law. Hence, the country received a relatively high score in this area. However, in the past, public sector P-nocis ;lnd servirf"" <::nrh :1"-u.r:.ltf"r :ind nnnrrar h":lvP nffPn hPPn hP'lvlhr REFORMING THE RENTJER STATE 57 cut back many subsidies, some remain, especially for basic food commodities, utilities, medicines, and cement. Iran has made some progress in this area in recent years with the deregu_Jation and abolishment of the "price enforcement courts." Still, the country _received a fairly low score largely because of massive subsidies and price controls on "essential" items such as fuel, power, and basic foodstuffs. The total cost of these subsidies is currently in the range of US$8-l 0 billion annually. In addition, the government sets minimum wages for each sector and region.
Property Rights. The Saudi judiciary is not perceived as independent, but as influenced by other branches of government. In addition, many businessmen complain that the enforcement of contracts is slow and often arbitrary. A recurring complaint is that the Saudi courts more often than not side witl1 local partners when disputes involve foreign firms or individuals. This is especially true in the case of well-connected Saudis.
Property rights arc even more tenuous in Iran. The country again received a 5.0 or the lowest score possible due to the widely held view that property rights arc not protected. A common complaint is that the rule of law in Iran is inconsistent or unsatisfactory. The courts are unwieldy and rarely arrive at a swift resolution. Many firms will not deal with Iran because the court system is perceived to be under government or religious influence. At best the judicial system is opaque. At worst it is corrupt and arbitrary.
Regulation. There is considerable regulation in Saudi Arabia, but for the most part, it is not transparent or oriented toward serving the consumer. There are also many inconsistencies in the country's regulatory process. "Saudization" or the mandated quotas of Saudi nationals on payrolls, changes often and unexpectedly. The regulatory system also facilitates a high level of corruption. Bribes often disguised as "commissions" are common in many industries. This situation may change, however, as Crown Prince Abdullah has made anticorruption one of his major priorities.
Again, Iran comes in with the lowest score possible. Many firms find dealing with the government a long, tedious process. The government effectively discourages the establishment of new businesses. Contract negotiations are often lengthy, excessively detailed, and painfully slow to finalize. The whole process appears riddled \Vi.th corruption. President Khatami's efforts at reform have been thwarted by the bureaucracy and various religious leaders.
In sum, there has been little movement toward increased economic freedom in Saudi Arabia during the last several years. In fact, during 1996-2004 there was a slight deterioration in the country's overall index. Future movements are difficult to predict simply because they appear to depend in large part on the state of the government's finances. When oil revenues are low and the government needs more employment generation in the private sector, there is usually increased resolve to undertake a new round of reforms. In 2004. with oil prices high and revenues abundant. official discussions of To some extent, otlicial resolve in Iran to push ahead with reforms mav also be driven by public finances. However, the failure of the reformers t~ make significant changes in the last frw years despite the seriousness of the country's unemployment suggests that the entrenched bureaucracy and Islamic hard-liners will remain a formidable obstacle to change in that c~untry.
Even more ominous, a new Iranian neoconservative movement hostile to reform of any sort and comprising mostly young and fervent advocates of Isbmic republican ideals is making a bid to seize control of Iran's political agenda. 38 
Governance
In addition to economic freedom, democracy and governance are increasingly seen as essential for long-run economic growth and prosperity. In fact, some dimensions of governance now sit at the center of academic and policy discussions of economic development. 39 Although the ranking of countries on the basis of their relative progress in attaining improved governance is inherently subjective, a recent World Bank study provides a set of rankings incorporating the full extent of our knowledge about this phenomenon. 40 Mon: precisely, the World Bank data set presents a set of estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule oflaw, and control of corruption.
REFORM GAPS AND CATCHING-UP
As expected, the overall quality of governance in Saudi Arabia and Iran lies below the norm (as shown in table 3.8). Of the two countries, Saudi Arabia has made considerably more progress in several areas, with governance levels actually above the norm in political stability, rule of law, and control of corruption. Saudi Arabia is also near the norm in the areas of government effectiveness and regulatory quality. The country's big governance deficit is in voice and accountability. There is considerable room for improving its governance structures, but Saudi Arabia appears to have a good initial start in laying a fairly solid foundation for sustained economic growth.
Iran's governance paints a stark contrast to that of Saudi Arabia, \.Vi th the country consistently below the norm. Also, many oflran's largest governance deficits fall in areas with direct economic ramifications: regulatory quality, control of corruption, and the rule of law. However, although the countrv did achieve some improvements over the 1996-2002 period in many of th~ governance subcategories, the country's overall average governance deteriorated due to a fairly sharp deterioration in political stability.
As a whole, both Middle East rentier and non-rentier economies have lagged considerably behind other major groupings of countries (see r;ihlr .~ 9\ Thailand, Mexico, and so on-have made considerably more progress in nearlv all of the major areas of reform. In turn, there is a comparable, but gene~ally smaller, gap between the various reform measures of the catching-up and advanced, endogenous growth countries.
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The reform gap between the Middle East rentier and non-rentier economies varies considerablv with the rentier states attaining lower levels in voice and accountability, bu; higher scores in the other major categories. In the economic area, the rentier states are much more interventionist than their non-rentier counterparts. Rentier states also lag in creating an environment conducive to foreign investors and in domestic price and wage reform. On the other hand, the rentier states lag considerably behind the more successful (catching-up) developing countries, especially in the area of governance. Although it would not necessarily guarantee the economic successes enjoyed by the catching-up countries, progress in a number of areas of reform is no doubt a necessary first step in transitioning into an environment capable of encouraging those economic forces necessary for achieving self-sustained growth. Statistically, the Middle East rentier states and the catching-up countries fall into two unique groupings based on their progress in (1) voice and accountability, and (2) reducing corruption. 44 In other words, knowing the progress made in just these two areas would allow one to predict which grouping a country belonged with a 96.8 percent chance of success. In all of the areas needing increased reform efforts, these two, especially voice and accountability, should have the highest priority.
A further statistical 45 analysis (see figure 3. 3) of the dimension 40 leading from rentier to catching-up status suggests the Middle East rentier states fall into three groupings of relative progress based on the level of voice and accountability reform: ( 1) a low group comprising of Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia; ( 2) an intermediate group consisting of Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE; and ( 3) the top group consisting only of Kuwait. Once progress in voice and accountability enables the threshold to catchingup status to be reached, improvement in regulatory quality would become a top priority for further advancement.
As a basis of comparison, in their quest to become high performing developing countries, the non-rentier economies in the Middle East must first achieve significant progress in reforming three key areas (in declining order of importance): ( 1) voice and accountability; (2) foreign investment; and (3) fiscal burden. For this group, the dimension leading to catching-up status is dominated by voice and accountability (as shown in figure 3 .4 Although Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Turkey have made the most progress in moving toward an environment more conducive for economic success, it is clear that they have a considerable distance to go before reaching that goal. Of the three main clusters of pre-catching-up countries, none has reached the third stage.
Although these findings provide interesting insights as to the challenges confronting the Middle Eastern countries, the question remains as to whether this is the best perspective for examining the two key rentier states in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Clearly these two countries are considerably larger, both economically and demographically, than the other Gulfrenticr states. Does this size factor systematically define a reform strategy unique to their needs?
To test whether a meaningfol delineation of rentier states exists, several larger non-Middle Eastern rentier economies-Angola, Nigeria, and Venezuela-were added to the analysis. As before, using the five governance and ten economic freedom variables as the basis of profiling unique policy environments shows (in table 3.10) considerable differences between them. The states fall into two groups: one with relatively large rentier states composed of Algeria, Angola, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and \'cnezuela, and the other with smaller rentier states-Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the llAE.
In particular, the larger rentier states have lagged considerably behind the smaller states in all areas of governance. Although the gaps are not as large, the larger rcntier economics have also not made nearlv the same rrogress as Somewhat surprisingly, the key reform area separating the two groups of countries is trade policy with the larger rentier countries lagging considerably behind their smaller counterparts. Just knowing the relative attainment of reforms in this area would have been sufficient to have correctly classified, with a high degree of probability, each country as a large or small retainer economv.
The progression from largest (Angola, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria) to smallest_ ( UAE) rentier state is defined by the progress made in the governance area ot regulatory quality (figure 3.5) with the smaller rent~er states define~ as a cl~ts ter of high regulatory quality environments. A middle cluster of countnes consists of Saudi Arabia and Venezuela with moderate attainment in this area. The remaining large rentier economies, including Iran, are in a cluster of extremely low regulatory quality. These findings arc consistent with the fact that the large rentier economies have pursued considerably different development strategies than their smaller counterparts. Because of their larger populations and domestic markets, industrialization made a certain amount of economic sense for this group. This industrialization has been achieved in large part through an inward-oriented import substitution strategy as evidenced, in part, by the group's lack of progress (openness) in trade policy.
The findings are also consistent with the patterns of declining effectiveness of government expenditures in Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as the observed negative TFP in both countries. Lack of good regulation (together with other reform deficiencies) in both countries has limited the potentially positive economic role of governments in both countries. Negative TFP is also found in many developing countries attempting to industrialize through relatively inward-oriented import substitution development strategies. .,.
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;I; ~ If higher oil revenues over the next kw years are not sufficient to begin reducing both countries' unemployment problems, increased reforms will have to be given a much higher priority than at present. This is especially the case in many key governance areas such as voice and accountability and regulatory reform. Government expenditures will have to be refocused on activities that directly support private sector investment. In Saudi Arabia's case (and to a lesser extent Iran's), the welfare state will have to be scaled back and a higher priority given to economic allocations. More emphasis must be placed on efficiency and productivity in government activities. There is also tremendous waste in government ministries that will have to be dealt with. In short, an environment will have to be created that encourages investment and provides better incentives for risktaking and job creation. Without these efforts, growing unemployment, rising pm·erty, and unfulfilled expectations will produce a volatile situation, perhaps beyond the control of either government.
TRANSITION STRATEGIES
Interestingly, nearly all of the patterns of governance, economic reform, and transition out of the rentier state described here are consistent with the assumptions underlying a model of growth and terrorism developed by Bremer and Kasarda. 48 Bremer and Kasarda see countries moving through three distinct stages as their economies evolve and become more sophisticated and market driven. By their criterion, Saudi Arabia and Iran fall in the first stage (along with countries such as Egypt and Pakistan) (see figure 3 .6). This group of economies has failed to move forward to the middle stage largely because of growth-limiting policies (captured by the various measures of economic freedom) and institutional rigidities (depicted by the various areas of governance).
To this basic economic/governance framework, Bremer and Kasarda add the dimensions of disillusionment and resentment. In effect, these countries have had a "failed take-off" in Rostow's terms. 49 Expectations of rapidly improved standards ofliving have been raised only to be left unfulfilled by the inability of the economy to sustain growth. Following Hirschman's observations on income disparity in developing countries, the tolerance of lowerincome groups for large-income inequalities also wears thin as they sec their dreams of a better lite fade, especially if they perceive the country's elites are a source of the country's economic stagnation or decline. 50 The key feature of Bremer and Kasarda's model is the historical record: "History suggests that failure to make steady progress through the New Second World transition's early phase to the middle period is extremely dangerous. If the transition stalls here-as it did in post-World War I Russia, and as it has now in much of the Middle East-failure can lead to revolution and al Qaeda-style international violence. " 51 The one thing that the nations stuck in the early phase have in common is slowness in adopting choice-based systems. Bremer and Kasarda define "choice-based" svstems as encompassing organizations-basically the economic freedom and governance measures noted earlier.
The large rentier states appear particularly susceptible to the failed processes noted by Bremer and Kasarda. By any standard, the economic freedom and governance indicators of the first group (table 3 .11) lie well below that of the second group. Deficic1Kies are seen nearly across the board, but are particularly evident in regulatory quality and government intervention, areas where Bremer and Kasarda stress lack of reforms are likely to retard progress to higher stages.
To further assess the relevance of the Bremer and Kasarda model for the Iarge rcntier economics, our set of six governance and ten economic freedom variables were examined statistically to see if they were capable of classifying groups of countries in a manner similar to those described by Bremer and Kasarda. The analysis was successful in identifying Stage 1 and Stage 3 as unique groupings based on their relative progress made in reforms. Significantly, all of the large renticr economics tdl in the first stage with a high degree of correct placement in this category. In addition, a group of -=·-'-· -~··--·-:"" I ~lh ... ,:~ U.,o .. :~ RM·,;l rhin» Fovn~ lnclont"si:i. Turkev. ,..,
The variables critical for profiling the countries in these groups were (in declining order of importance): government efficiency, voice and accountability, and corruption. These arc all areas consistent with the Bremer and Kasarda contention that deficiencies cause growth in the first stage to fall to levels incapable of creating adequate jobs and sustaining economic growth.
As noted earlier, another area stressed by Bremer and Kasarda, improved regulatory quality, seems to be critical in moving countries along the New Second World dimension to higher stages ( figure 3.7) . In the progression to the second stage, Iran is in a group of countries with very low regulatory quality. Through their modest efforts at improving government effectiveness, the Iranians have passed Libya and Algeria. The country clearly lags behind Saudi Arabia (and Egypt and Turkey) in moving up the ladder to the second stage of Bremer and Kasarda 's New Second World of development. However, compared with the progress made by a country such as Israel, it is apparent the Saudis have a very long reform road ahead of them.
None of this bodes particularly well for the Saudis or the Iranians. Both countries appear to be going down the road to disaster projected for Bremer and Kasarda's stage one countries. In Saudi Arabia's case, it is clear that ten or fifteen years ago, when many of the economy's problems were becoming clearly apparent, the government had time on its side. 52 A well thought-out neoliberal reform program stressing free markets, access to capital, integration into the world economy, and major efforts in the various areas of governance, especially regulation and corruption, could have been undertaken at a safe pace, laying the foundation for the transition to a higher growth path and Bremer and Kasarda's middle stage of development. Instead, the government postponed hard decisions, hoping that a new oil boom would solve all of its problems. None was forthcoming, nor will one likely appear in the fi.lreseeable future after the current oil boom subsides. As a result, the Saudi authorities find an economy still mired in Bremer and Kasarda's first stage and facing an unemployment rate that is approaching 30 percent. 53 Poverty is definitely on the rise and, even more ominously, an increasing number of Saudis complain that their national wealth is being plundered by corrupt members of the royal family. 54 Increasingly, one hears:
there's a lot of frustration and anxiety among young Saudi men. Almost half of them have lost hope for the future. And they arc ripe for recruitment by Islamic extremists ... Adding to the frustration arc the lack of outlets for discussion and debate. Trade unions are barred as are all other protessional associations ... Saudi society has tew political tools to counter the extremism that has taken root here and the results are actions like the recent bombings in Riyadh. 55 Domestic terrorism does not plague Iran nearly to the extent found in Saudi Arabia, nevertheless the picture in many ways is gloomier because Iran lags considerably behind Saudi Arabia in nearly all areas of reform. Vested interests in the existing system have greatly limited reform. Because many opposed to reform have religious legitimacy, there are only modest prospects for dramatic reforms in the near future. In turn, the reform gap has limited the private sector's ability to create jobs. At the same time rapid demographics are , overwhelming the public sector's ability to expand hiring. The result is a progressive breakdown of the link uniting the population to the state through the rentier distribution system. Given the government's low tolerance for direct protest, the population's growing dissatisfaction and frustration is likely to manifest itself in the form of increased political and economic instability.
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAQ
Iraq certainly has a lot to learn from the experiences of Saudi Arabia and Iran. With the fall of Saddam, the country had the golden opportunity of starting with a clean slate. Perhaps because of the difficulties in moving ahead with reform, once entrenched interests were strengthened by the rentier state redistributive mechanisms. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was quick to install a package of reforms reminiscent of the shock therapy programs carried out in the early to mid-l 990s in many of the Transition Economies of Central and Eastern Europe. Overnight, Iraq became the most open economy in the Arab world. 56 The reforms clearly incorporated much of the agenda originally laid out in the now somewhat discredited Washington Consensus. 57 The main thrust of the Washington Consensus was a set of actions that, if taken at an early stage of transition, should have facilitated a smooth evolution into the world economv. It consisted of manv elements of the economic fTecdom measures (liberalization, stabilization, and fiscal austerity), stressing the importance of bringing down inflation and establishing economic growth. It also incorporated a numbt:r of elements of microeconomic reform (e.g., privatization, promoting FDI), as well as structural/administrative reforms (e.g., property rights, replacement of quantitative restrictions). Specifo.:ally, these included: Progress of reform design and implementation varies considerably by categories; the September 2003 CPA reforms have little to say about fiscal discipline or public expenditure priorities, no doubt due to the great uncertainty surrounding oil revenues, the external debt situation, and foreign assistance. Surprisingly, however, property rights, a key element of the neoliberal reforms, has received less attention than one might have expected. It is also clear that, by any measure, Iraq world score very high on an economic freedom index. On the other hand, very little has been implemented or even discussed in the important areas of complementary governance: corporate governance, :mticorruption, tlexible labor markets, World Trade Organization agreements, financial codes and standards, prudent capital account opening, nonintermediate exchange rate regimes, independent central banks/inflation targeting, social satCtv nets, and targeted poverty reduction. Of these, only some initial, albeit limi~ed, progress has occurred in the areas of financial standards and central hanking.
Perhaps the intent of the CPA and the current provisional government is to simply deter many of the specifics in these areas to an elected Iraqi government. However, as the cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia illustrate, governance reform may be a more critical clement in assuring Iraq is able to progress along the path to a stable modern economy. Without significant improvement in these areas in the near foture, the country is likely to have nn hr th<'" disadvantages of the free market to show fix its reform effrirts. The 
